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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY 
INTER VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST; 
LaRUE FISHER, individually; 
LaRUE FISHER, Settlor and 
Trustee of The George Fisher, 
Jr. Family Inter Vivos 
Revocable Trust Agreement; and 
BRENT ELMER FISHER, Co-Trustee 
of The George Fisher, Jr. 
Family Inter Vivos Revocable 
Trust Agreement, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
MAX GEORGE FISHER and JOYCE 
FISHER, 
Defendants and 
Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
All the parties to this action are residents of 
Duchesne County, Utah. The action seeks enforcement of an Escrow 
Agreement concerning real property in Duchesne County. The case 
was tried to the Court, Judge A. Lynn Payne presiding, without a 
jury. The plaintiffs are Appellants and the defendants are 
Appellees and also Cross-Appellants. Neither side objected to 
reference of the appeal to the Court of Appeals and the reference 
was made on February 3, 1995. 
Case No. 940577-CA 
Priority Rule 29(b)(15) 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
1. Did George Fisher, Jr., now deceased, make an 
oral agreement with Appellee Max Fisher postponing payments due 
under the Escrow Agreement? 
2. Was Appellant LaRue Fisher, wife of deceased 
George Fisher, Jr., bound by the actions of George Fisher, Jr.? 
3. Assuming that an oral agreement was made, is it 
void because of the statute of frauds? 
4. Was a payment for cattle sold in 1979 properly 
allowed by the Court as a payment on the contract for the sale of 
property? 
5. Was the remedy of forfeiture as sought by the 
Appellants inequitable under the facts before the Court? 
6. Should the Court have allowed Appellants' 
attorney fees? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AS TO THE SEVERAL ISSUES 
1. Did George Fisher, Jr., now deceased, make an oral 
agreement with Appellee Max Fisher postponing payments 
due under the Escrow Agreement? 
The Court found that an oral agreement was entered into 
based on conversations between George Fisher, Jr. and Max Fisher. 
Great deference must be accorded to the Findings of the Court 
requiring a marshalling of the evidence. Slattery v. Covey & Co., 
857 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993); Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 
577 (Utah App. 1993); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a); a 
"clearly erroneous standard," 7 Utah Bar Journal 9, 14, ^ 3a. 
The Court's finding that George Fisher and Max Fisher 
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contemplated that demand for payment would commence a duty to make 
annual payments of $10,000 each should require a different standard 
of review. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), holds 
that "reasonable suspicion determinations" in the mind of a police 
officer "is reviewable non-deferentially for correctness, as 
opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for clear error." 
We suggest that determining what was in the minds of the Fishers is 
a comparable determination. 
2. Was Appellant LaRue Fisher, wife of deceased George 
Fisher, Jr., bound by the actions of George Fisher, Jr.? 
The question is whether the husband was the authorized 
agent of LaRue Fisher in the making of an Agreement which includes 
the issue of the terms of the agreement. The Court's Findings on 
this matter also are entitled to great deference and the evidence 
needs to be marshalled. See the cases cited under Point 1 and the 
many other cases cited in 7 Utah Bar Journal 9, 14, % 3a. 
3. Assuming that an oral agreement was made, is it void 
because of the statute of frauds? 
The Court held that the statute of frauds did not apply, 
because the agreement did not involve title to the real estate. 
This is, in effect, a Conclusion of Law which assumes that the 
Findings of Fact as to the agreement are valid. This Court is to 
make that decision without deference to the conclusion of the trial 
judge. Hansen v. Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P. 2d 
184, 186 (Utah App. 1993); Schurtz v. BMW of North America, 814 
P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Zion's Properties v. Holt, 538 P.2d 
1319 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 42-43, 465 
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P.2d 356 (Utah 1970); 7 Utah Bar Journal 9, 21 % CI, describes it 
as a "standard of correctness." 
4 . Was a payment for cattle sold in 1979 properly allowed by 
the Court as a payment on the contract for the sale of 
property? 
This is a Finding of Fact, which is entitled to great 
deference. Appellant must marshal the evidence and show 
overwhelming evidence against the finding of the Court. Cases are 
cited under Point 1. The Slattery, supra, case holds that a 
finding can be overturned upon a sufficient showing. 
5. Was the remedy of forfeiture as sought by the Appellants 
inequitable under the facts before the Court? 
The Trial Court held that the Notice of Termination of 
Agreement (Ex. P5) was proper in form (R. 249, LI. 20-21), but that 
it was premature because of the oral agreement made by George 
Fisher, Jr. and Max Fisher (R. 253, Ll. 3-4; R. 257, Ll. 12-13). 
The Court also ruled that it would be inequitable to forfeit the 
property under the Notice (R. 257, Ll. 9-15; R. 258, Ll. 3-9). 
This becomes relevant if this Court holds that there was no 
modifying oral agreement. The determination of whether forfeiture 
would have been inequitable becomes a discretionary ruling, which 
probably would be upheld unless it manifests a clear abuse of 
discretion. Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah App. 1993) . In 
real estate forfeiture actions, the Utah Supreme Court has examined 
the facts carefully and in detail to determine whether contracts 
calling for a forfeiture should be enforced or whether they are 
unreasonable, unconscionable or unfair as determined by the 
Appellate Court. Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1977); 
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Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 275, 332 P.2d 989 (1958); Peck 
v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 428, 327 P.2d 712 (1958) . 
6. Should the Court have allowed Appellants' attorney fees? 
This is a matter of interpretation of the Escrow 
Agreement and is addressed to the discretion of this Court. If all 
the payments were past due, attorney fees should have been awarded 
unless equities are against the plaintiff. This is a conclusion of 
law. See citation under Point 3, also Fullman v. Blood, 546 P.2d 
606, 610 (Utah 1976) . 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The only statute involved is the statute of frauds. 
Either or both of §§ 25-5-1, 3 or 4, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
Amended) are urged as applicable. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This was an action for recovery and forfeiture of a 600 
acre ranch in Duchesne County, which was sold under an Escrow 
Agreement in 1974 by George Fisher, Jr. and Appellant LaRue Fisher 
to the Appellees (Ex. P-l) . The price was $124,000 with $8,280 
down and the balance payable $10,000 per year with interest at five 
percent (5%) . Because of default in payments, a Notice of 
Termination was served in behalf of the Appellants (Ex. P-5), 
following the death of George Fisher, Jr., the husband of LaRue 
Fisher. The Defendants contended they owed only the amounts not 
barred by the statute of limitations (Ex. D-6) . Following 
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commencement of the action for forfeiture, Appellees pleaded that 
they had paid in full, that the statute of limitations barred 
payments, that Appellants were barred by reason of adverse 
possession, laches and estoppel, and that they owed nothing (R. 
22) . 
Course of Proceeding 
The case was tried without a jury. Defendants moved for 
dismissal on the ground that the Notice of Termination did not fix 
the amount that was owing (Tr. 368), which matter was taken under 
advisement by the Trial Court (Tr. 3 78), and the trial proceeded on 
a stipulated basis (Tr. 381) . The Court later ruled that dismissal 
was not appropriate (R. 249, Ll. 21-22). Both sides offered oral 
and written evidence in support of their positions. The Court took 
the matter under advisement at the conclusion of arguments. 
Disposition in Trial Court 
Judge Payne gave careful consideration to at least some 
of the facts involved in the case and made what he considered was 
an equitable disposition of the case. His lengthy decision does 
not distinguish between facts, conclusions of law and decision. 
Appellants moved to amend the Judgment, requesting a transcript in 
order to compare the testimony with the Judge's decision (R. 275) . 
This was denied (R. 284) . In a conference telephone call, the 
Judge stated that he intended that decision to be final and entered 
only a perfunctory ruling (R. 284) as a means of fixing the time 
for appeal. 
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Statement of Facts 
Simply stated, this is the case before the Court: In 
1974 George and LaRue Fisher entered into the Escrow Agreement (Ex. 
P-l) with their son Max and his wife Joyce. It provided for the 
sale of 600 acres of land in Duchesne County at a price of 
$124,000, giving credit for $8,250 of work previously done, and 
calling for payments of $10,000 per year at five percent (5%) 
interest. The Appellees, who were the Buyers, entered into 
possession and occupied the property, farmed it, ranched it, and 
lived on it until the death of the father, George Fisher, Jr., in 
1992. Appellant, the surviving wife, employed counsel, seeking 
performance of the contract, taking the position that no payments 
had been made. After conferring with the Defendants (Tr. 424, 612-
613) , a Notice terminating the agreement (Ex. P-5) was served on 
them. By response the Defendants offered $57,100 in full payment 
(Ex. D-6), which was not satisfactory to Appellants, and this 
action was instituted. Defendants defended on the grounds of the 
statute of limitations, adverse possession, laches, estoppel, and 
payment having been made in full (R. 22) . 
Facts as to Each Issue 
1. Did George Fisher, Jr., now deceased, make an oral 
agreement with Appellee Max Fisher postponing payments due under 
the Escrow Agreement? 
Defendants did not plead or argue that an oral agreement 
was made between George Fisher in behalf of the Appellants and Max 
Fisher in behalf of the Appellees that payments did not have to be 
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made until there was a demand for payments. This solution was 
determined by the Court as a means of avoiding a decision on the 
statute of limitations and also as a means of avoiding a burden on 
the Defendants of either forfeiture of the property or a judicial 
sale for the amount owing, including interest. 
In order to point out the fallacy of the Court's 
Decision, including both Findings and Conclusions creating the 
agreement, Appellants moved to alter or amend the Judgment to be 
based upon a transcript of the testimony (R. 275-283). The Court 
denied this (R. 284) , resulting in the appeal and the obtaining of 
the transcript of testimony. 
Appellants concede that no written demand was made for 
any of the payments by George Fisher and that George Fisher talked 
to Max Fisher about the payments. Appellants challenge the Court's 
Decision that there was an oral agreement as to "when he should 
begin making payments" (R. 251, L. 22) , or that "payments" were 
delayed (R. 252, L. 7), or that Max was to "invest yearly 
installment payments" (R. 252, L. 11), and that Max "could not 
afford yearly payments" (R. 252, L. 19) . The Court also noted that 
no demand was ever made "that yearly payments begin" (R. 252, L. 
25) and that "yearly payments were not due until May 1, 19 93" (R. 
253, L. 4). 
Marshalling of the evidence is appropriate to determine 
just what the testimony of Max Fisher was as to his conversations 
concerning payments as they became due. Max Fisher testified as to 
several conversations with his father as follows: 
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In a conversation in 1974, Max asked George what he 
wanted him to do about the payments. George said, "You go ahead 
and put it into the place," . . . "If you got the money to pay this, 
put it into this place" and "When I want that place payment, I will 
ask you for that place payment. ... That place payment will not do 
me no good because of taxes" (Tr. 395, LI. 1, 6, 8-9, 14-16). 
As to the payment in 1979, see Point 4. 
In about 1988 there was a conversation about rebuilding 
the deteriorated home on the place. Max was asked by Mr. Kunz, 
"Did he actually say you would not be pressed to make payments?" 
Answer: "No, he didn't actually say that I wouldn't be pressed to 
it, but he says, 'Don't worry about it.' He says, 'Go ahead and 
build the new home.'" ... " No, he never told me not to worry 
about it and he didn't tell me he relieved me of ..." (Tr. 419, Ll. 
11-19) 
Appellee Joyce Fisher testified that she had no 
conversations with the Appellants about payments but that Max 
Fisher told her about the conversation in 1975. She was asked: 
"Did you have any concern about the payments thereafter?" to which 
she said she did. When asked what she did about it, she said, "I 
would ask Max to have this taken--I'd ask him to do something with 
his dad. I said, 'Have him put something on paper, do something.'" 
"... And I asked him this over 20 years." (Tr. 477, Ll. 1-14) 
Plaintiffs submit that there is no testimony that George 
Fisher and Defendant Max Fisher ever discussed having the payments 
commence on an annual basis at a later time. The Decision of the 
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Trial Court admits this and substitutes the opinion of the Court 
for testimony by this paragraph of the Decision: 
The parties never specifically addressed 
the issue as to whether all payments would 
become due when George requested payments to 
commence. In view of the fact that the 
financial condition of Max and George would 
not have allowed them to pay all of the 
accumulated payments at one time (which George 
was aware of) , and in view of the fact that 
George said that when he wanted payments he 
would ask for them, the Court finds that the 
agreement between Max and George to amend the 
contract did not contemplate that all prior 
payments become due immediately upon the 
request of the Sellers. It was contemplated 
and agreed that payments would be delayed and 
commenced again when George requested them. 
(R. 257, LI. 15-20) 
Appellants submit that on the issue of commencing 
payments on an annual basis when a demand is made, there is no 
support in the testimony. If that is a Finding of Fact, it is 
without support. If it is a Conclusion of Law, there is no Finding 
of Fact or evidence to support it and it should be rejected. 
In this case neither of the parties pleaded or argued for 
the disposition made by the Court. It would be reasonable to limit 
the result to the pleadings. 50 West Broadway Associates v. The 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, et al. , 784 P. 2d 1162, 1172 
(Utah 1989), where the Court observed: 
However, that formula is not in the 
contract and neither party argued for it in 
the trial court. It is simply the result the 
trial court apparently deemed "equitable." 
Nevertheless, it is the contract that 
governs this dispute. In truth, the trial 
court reached a compromise solution which it 
worked out on its own, apart from the contract 
language. The result may be a fair 
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compromise, but it is not what the contract 
calls for. 
In Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987), 
this Court held that the decision of the trial court should be in 
accordance with the pleadings unless the parties have tried the 
case as though that were an issue and as though the pleadings had 
been amended to include that issue, saying: 
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that 
issues tried by express or implied consent 
shall be treated as if raised in the 
pleadings. ... If a theory of recovery is 
fully tried by the parties, the court may base 
its decision on that theory and deem the 
pleadings amended, even if the theory was not 
originally pleaded or set forth in the 
pleadings or the pretrial order. M.B.I. Motor 
Company v. Lotus East, 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th 
Cir. 1974). However, that the issue has, in 
fact, been tried, and that this procedure has 
been authorized by express or implied consent 
of the parties must be evident from the 
record. 
Contrary to what the Judge speculated was in the 
contemplation of the parties, there was testimony as to what was 
actually in the mind of George Fisher, Jr. when he did not insist 
on the payments being made as they fell due. Plaintiff LaRue 
Fisher was asked if she ever talked to George about the payments on 
the contract. She answered that she had and said: 
"I've talked to him quite often. And he just 
didn't want trouble in the family and he just-
-he wanted to do it, but he kept saying, 'Max 
will be the loser.' And that's the thing I 
got--that's what he used to say 'Max will be 
the loser if he doesn't want to come forth in 
a lot of it.'" ... "I've been hurt about it. 
I've really been hurt." (Tr. 551, LI. 16-24) 
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Kim M. Fisher, a son of George and LaRue Fisher, 
testified that he had a conversation with his father George Fisher 
at the Chuck-O-Rama in Provo at the end of March 1992 (Tr. 571, Ll. 
20-24) , at which Kim Fisher asked his father to take care of the 
problem between him and Max and 
"My father told me, he says, 'I can't.' He 
says, 'I can't take my son off that place.'" 
... "I can't take my son off that place.' And 
he says, "Max will be the one to lose.' He 
says, 'If he doesn't make right with that 
place and something happens to me the property 
will automatically go back in the trust and 
there shouldn't be any problems.' And that's 
exactly how dad felt this would be handled." 
(Tr. 573, Ll. 1-9) 
Susan Fisher Thacker, daughter of George and LaRue Fisher 
(Tr. 588, L. 7), also testified to a conversation with her father 
after he had said, "Max will be the loser." (Tr. 589, Ll. 23-24). 
When asked how Max would be the loser, George Fisher responded, 
according to Susan Fisher Thacker, 
"He just said that Max would be the loser. He 
said the property would all go back in the 
estate or Max would have to pay. And so--I 
didn't pursue it any further than that with 
dad." (Tr. 591, Ll. 15-18) 
Peggy Fisher, who is Mrs. Kim Fisher (Tr. 595, Ll. 
testified to a conversation with her father-in-law George 
Jr. , 
"He told us that Max was a poor manager and 
that he was too lazy to milk the cows. And 
that what he and LaRue had built over the 
years he had let go. And that he would be the 
loser in the end and not to worry about it." 
(Tr. 598, Ll. 17-20) 
23-25), 
Fisher, 
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There is no evidence that George Fisher, Jr. had in mind 
taking no action against his son for family reasons and then after 
he was gone let annual payments start and continue until they had 
been paid. The Trial Court found that all the payments were due 
plus interest, less the down payment and the payment of $24,980, 
which was paid in 1979 (R. 258, Ll. 21-24) . The Court gave no 
figure as to the amount owing. 
Following the issuance of the Court's Decision on 
September 30, 1994, Plaintiffs submitted a Response to Defendants' 
Objection to Proposed Order and Judgment suggesting that allowing 
the 1979 cattle payment of $24,980 as a payment on the contract 
would leave a balance of $109,700 and interest on that amount of 
$83,109 to 1994 would make a total of $192,809 (R. 263-273 at 266) . 
An amortization schedule based on a theoretical acceptance of 
$20,000 suggested that it would take 41 years at $10,000 a year to 
pay that off (R. 26 9, Addenda P. 12). 
Actually, those calculations were in error. The balance 
owing on the contract after the down payment was $115,720. 
Interest at 5% on that amount from May 1, 1974 to May 1, 1979 would 
be $28,930 or a total of $144,650. Crediting $24,980 to that would 
leave $119,670 as the balance owing on May 2, 1979, representing 
$115,720 of principal and $3,950 of interest. 
Interest at 5% per annum on $115,720 for 15 years to 
May 1, 1994 would be $86,790 plus the $3,950 of carry-over 
interest, being the amount over principal on May 2, 1979, making a 
total of $206,460. If judgment were entered on that amount at 5% 
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per annum, it obviously would never pay off. That appears to be 
what Plaintiffs are entitled to under the Trial Judge's Decision. 
If, for some reason, it should be held that Defendants 
are able to pay the interest off without a judgment and without 
compounding interest, it would take nine years to pay off the 
$90,740 of interest. Interest on $115,720 at 5% would be $5,785 
per year. A payment of $10,000 would therefore reduce the $90,740 
of accumulated interest by $4,215 per year and would require 21-1/2 
years to pay it off. Amortization of the $115,720 at $10,000 per 
year and 5% interest would require 18 years according to the 
schedule at Addenda p. 14, or a total of 3 9-1/2 years. 
In addition to that, dollars are becoming less valuable 
because of inflation. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Consumer Price Index, the inflation went from an index of 49.3 in 
1974 to 144.5 in 1994 (Addenda P. 15). This was supplied to the 
Trial Judge (R. 220-222) . That is an inflation rate of 193%. This 
means that payment now is much less in real value than was 
contemplated, without looking at inflation over the next 39-1/2 
years. 
The logical relief would be a judgment of $206,460 at 
judgment interest of 5% or more; and at $10,000 per year, it would 
never pay off. 
To suggest that George Fisher, Jr. or even Max Fisher had 
in mind any such unreasonable result for paying for the ranch is 
completely unrealistic. 
-15-
2. Was Appellant LaRue Fishery wife of deceased George 
Fisher, Jr., bound by the actions of George Fisher, Jr.? 
There was no testimony that Appellant LaRue Fisher agreed 
to postpone any of the annual payments. The Court does not 
challenge this, as shown by the following statement in the 
Decision: 
The Court is convinced that the agreement 
and modification were each negotiated entirely 
between George and Max. Where there was 
disagreement, LaRue acquiesced to the will of 
George. This is seen in their disagreement 
over the payments. LaRue clearly wanted the 
payments to be made. She discussed this 
subject often with George but could not get 
him to take action. Instead of taking 
independent action, she submitted to his will. 
(R. 254, LI. 21-24) 
Although the Court recognized that this litigation 
involves a family problem, both as between George Fisher and his 
wife, the Appellant LaRue Fisher, and also as between father and 
son, rather than hold that the failure to take positive action by 
the parents was because of the family relationship, the Court ruled 
that George Fisher agreed not to require payments. The Court also 
recognized that George Fisher and his wife did not have the same 
views on this (R. 254, supra) . The Court held that LaRue was bound 
by the "agreement" made by George without mentioning her. At page 
7 of his Decision, the Court discusses this matter but concludes 
that LaRue "is also bound by the agreement to postpone payments 
(R. 255, LI. 21-22). 
The evidence is plain that Appellant LaRue Fisher did not 
acquiesce in not requiring the payments and that this was known to 
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the family as having created a difficult situation, as will 
hereafter be shown by reference to the evidence. It is plain that 
unwillingness to rock the marital boat was the reason she did not 
take a positive stand against the Defendants by insisting upon the 
payments. 
LaRue Fisher testified that prior to George's death, she 
demanded twice that Appellees make payments that were due (Tr. 33 9, 
L. 20). The first time was prior to the building of the new home 
on the ranch, when she and her husband George called on the 
Appellees and "George said, 'We've come down to see if we could get 
started on these payments.' And Joyce said, 'What payments?' She 
said, 'We have paid.' And he said, 'Go get the receipts.'" 
(Tr. 354, LI. 4-10 and 20-25) 
The second time was at a cemetery when Max and Joyce 
Fisher were sitting in their car, which was about five or six years 
ago (Tr. 360, Ll. 8-10), when LaRue Fisher said, "I think it's time 
now that we're getting busy on payments. And Max looked at me and 
'ha ha' now this is what he done." (Tr. 359, Ll. 9-13). Both Max 
and Joyce Fisher denied that these conversations took place, but 
LaRue Fisher's attitude was testified to by other persons. 
James J. Oman testified that he was well acquainted with 
all the parties and when asked about payments testified, 
"Well, it was discussed at least twice while 
we were--when we were making our visits with 
George and LaRue. And it was brought up that 
Max hadn't made any payments. And LaRue said, 
' I think we should push that and get the 
payments, plus interest on the payments.' ... 
And George said, 'I don't think we should 
charge interest on it.'" When asked if George 
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indicated that he wanted to force Max into 
making payments, Mr. Oman answered, "No." (Tr. 
526, Ll. 14-25) 
When Mr. Oman was asked if "this was a sore spot between George and 
LaRue," he answered, "There was no doubt about it. It was." (Tr. 
528, L. 24) When asked about his impression of the attitude 
between George Fisher and LaRue Fisher, Mr. Oman testified, 
"He didn't say anything about the debt. The 
only thing I heard him say was--LaRue says we 
should have the full payment, plus interest, 
and George says, 'I don't think we should 
charge interest.'" (Tr. 528, Ll. 14-17) 
"Well, just that he sort of shrugged it off. 
He liked, as the testimony has been given, he 
liked to tease LaRue about it and she would 
kind of get upset and maybe a little annoyed 
at George for doing that. But he would just 
kind of--well, I don't know whether these was 
his exact words, but he kind of said, 'Let it 
go.'" (Tr. 531, Ll. 14-19) 
Phillip J. Timothy, who testified that he is a cousin of 
Max Fisher (Tr. 516, L. 21), testified that he didn't feel 
comfortable getting involved in the middle of this problem (Tr. 
517, Ll. 17-19) He testified that at a family reunion two or three 
years ago he had a conversation with George Fisher and his wife 
LaRue and Timothy's wife, and he testified: 
"And I don't know how it came up for sure. 
Something came up about the ranch, the money 
that was owed on the ranch and Max had owed 
some money and not paid. And LaRue was quite 
upset. She got upset. George was a tease and 
he laughed and joked a little bit about it, 
but never joked but kind of sluffed it off--
you know--George was a joker." (Tr. 519, Ll. 
18-24) 
Then he went on to testify: 
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11
 She said she felt that the debt should be 
paid in full and that he should pay interest 
and he should pay everything in full and he 
had not done so and was quite upset over it. 
And that he had not done this. And then I 
didn't know anything about it. And George he 
just kind of turned sideways in his chair, I 
can remember, and he said, "LaRue, let's just 
not talk about it. Let's not get into it." 
He says, "I don't want to get into it 
tonight." Something to that effect. And he 
says, "I know that there's been other things 
given to the other kids that is almost as much 
as this is." (Tr. 520, Ll. 2-12) 
Max also testified that the relationship between him and 
his mother and between his wife Joyce and his motner LaRue Fisher 
was not good (Tr. 431; 432; 433; 434; 460-461; 611, Ll. 5-19). 
LaRue Fisher testified to the same difficulty (Tr. 550-552) . Oman 
also so testified (Tr. 528, Ll. 1-8). 
3. Assuming that an oral agreement was made, is it void 
because of the statute of frauds? 
There was no written evidence from either side touching 
on the question of postponing the annual payments. 
Appellants filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Reply 
and the Answer to the Counterclaim (R. 176) and filed the Amended 
Reply and Answer (R. 180), which was approved (R. 184). This was 
for the purpose of pleading the statute of frauds, Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 25-5-1, 3 and 4, arguing that this barred conver-
sations between Max Fisher and George Fisher in the absence of 
Appellant LaRue Fisher and was a defense as to the issue of 
estoppel. The Memorandum cited Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 
465 P.2d 356 (R. Ill), arguing that that case holds that estoppel 
was not available unless the relying party had gone to the other 
joint tenant seeking approval or disapproval of the oral agreement 
(R. 177) . The Trial Court held that this case did not apply 
because the statute of frauds applied only to a change of title to 
the property (R. 389, Ll. 15-23, R. 390-391), so the Court 
permitted testimony of Max Fisher as to conversations with his now 
deceased father. The Court in its decision ruled that the statute 
of frauds did not apply to the modification of the oral agreement 
which was at issue in this case (R. 257, Ll. 24-25 to R. 258, Ll. 
1-2) and didn't consider the issue of estoppel. 
Appellee Joyce Fisher recognized the uncertainty of oral 
statements and testified that for 20 years she had tried to get 
Max, her husband, to have reduced to writing whatever George 
Fisher, Jr. was willing to concede. She said she had concern about 
the payments and when asked what she did about it, she said, 
"I would ask Max to have this taken--I'd ask 
him to do something with his dad. I said, 
'Have him put something on paper. Do 
something.' And he'd just tell me, 'No, don't 
worry about it. Dad's taking care of it.' 
And I asked him over 2 0 years." (Tr. 4 77, Ll. 
3-14) 
Following the conversation about building the home on the 
ranch and overhearing a conversation between George and Max 
concerning the payments, Joyce Fisher testified, 
"I was after him more. I said, 'You need to 
get with your dad and get this settled. Get 
it on paper. Get something. Anything.' Max 
said, 'Don't worry about it, dad's got it 
taken care of.'" She was asked if she then 
quit worrying about it and she answered, "That 
was my answer for 15 years or whatever we was 
there." 
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She testified that there was nothing in writing to change the 
original agreement. (Tr. 486-487) 
4. Was a payment for cattle sold in 1979 properly 
allowed by the Court as a payment on the contract for the sale of 
property? 
The Notice of Termination (Ex. P-5) followed by the 
Complaint of the Appellants (R. 1-12) took the position that no 
payments had been made on the contract other than the down payment. 
Defendants contended that a check in payment of cattle sold in 1979 
was given to the decedent George Fisher as a payment on the 
contract. Plaintiffs contended that the cattle sold belonged to 
George and LaRue Fisher and was not a payment on the contract. 
Max Fisher testified that in 1979 he told his father he 
had sold milk cows and wanted him to take the money, and George 
Fisher said he didn't want it (Tr. 402, Ll. 7-18) , and Max insisted 
that he take one of the checks, which was the smaller one 
identified on Ex. D-7 in the amount of $24,980 (Tr. 89 and 90) . He 
further testified that these were his cows and not George Fisher's 
cows (Tr. 406) and that he hauled the cattle to the point of sale 
and had the check made payable to his folks (Tr. 4 07, Ll. 2-6) . He 
also testified that he had the check made out to his father because 
he didn't want any trouble with income tax (Tr. 447). The 
Defendants' record of cattle sales (Ex. P-8) shows sales of cattle 
in 1979 totaling $21,007.75 and does not show any sale of $24,980 
or $58,000 (Tr. 451 and Ex. P-8) . There is nothing that shows they 
were the cattle of Max Fisher and they were "handled and disposed 
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of as if they were his [George Fisher's] cattle and handled as 
though he was the owner" (Tr. 4 52). 
Joyce Fisher testified that Max sold cattle in 1979 and 
got $58,000 (Tr. 480) and also $24,000 and that the cows were 
theirs and not George's. She testified that she kept the record of 
sales of cows which is Exhibit P-8 and that the record does not 
show any sale of $58,000 but does show a number of sales totaling 
$21,000 something (Tr. 490). She doesn't know why the record of 
the other cattle sales were not in that book (Tr. 490, L. 21) . In 
1979 she and Max sold more than $100,000 worth of cattle (Tr. 491, 
L. 16) . She examined the 1979 tax return of her and Max Fisher and 
doesn't know why the $24,980 does not appear in the return. The 
figure $45,000 on the tax return doesn't match either the $24,980 
or the $58,000 (Tr. 492). 
Joyce Fisher also testified that the $58,000 and $21,000 
were reported to their accountant (Tr. 493), but she doesn't know 
whether "the money that went directly to George was reported as 
your income" (Tr. 493-494; also Tr. 495, Ll. 5-13). 
Plaintiff LaRue Fisher testified that she kept a journal 
of income and expenses (Tr. 545, Ll. 9-19), five pages from vv.iich 
were marked as Exhibit P-12 (Tr. 546) . The exhibit shows that 
sales of cattle in 1979 were $24,986 (?) for 26 head of Holstein 
cows (Tr. 548, Ll. 15-17). These were some of the cattle left on 
the place in 1974 and that figure was reported to IRS (Tr. 54 9, Ll. 
1-7; also Tr. 545, Ll. 10-14). LaRue Fisher also testified that 
Exhibit P-12 shows income in 1973 of $61,363.82, that Max's share 
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was $10,698.75, and that this was milk income based on their cattle 
and also on Max's cattle (Tr. 547) . She testified that of the cows 
left on the farm for Max to milk in 1974, she thought 113 cows were 
left and there were at least 70 or 80 that belonged to George and 
her (Tr. 557, Ll. 12-14) . She knows that in 1974 her husband 
George was milking 113 head of cows (Tr. 559, Ll. 16-18) . She also 
testified that the $61,000 of milk income in 1973 was before 
expenses and the $10,000 paid to Max was clear, not subject to any 
payment of expenses (Tr. 562); the number of cows was between 70 
and 8 0 that belonged to her and George, and 113 was the total that 
George was milking in 1974 (Tr. 563) . The 113 cows is a number she 
definitely remembers (Tr. 564) and the number of 70 to 80 is the 
approximate number of cows that she and George owned at the time of 
sale (Tr. 564). Max testified that George and LaRue didn't leave 
that many cows on the place (Tr. 608). 
5. Was the remedy of forfeiture as sought by the 
Appellants inequitable under the facts before the Court? 
The Court found it would be inequitable to order 
forfeiture of the property because the Appellants would receive the 
new home on the property "free of any encumbrance" while the 
Defendants would be liable for the pledge of the cattle and 
equipment in the amount of approximately $30,000 (R. 252, Ll. 16-
18) . In addition, the Court found that other buildings were built, 
sprinkling systems were installed, the land was cleared and graded, 
ponds were constructed and expanded, and the property was improved 
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substantially with monies which could otherwise have been paid on 
the contract (R. 257, Ll. 6-10). 
In determining whether forfeiture would be inequitable, 
the Court must take into account the pluses as well as the minuses. 
In Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 275, 332 P.2d 989 (1958), 
the purchasers sued to recover payments made on a real estate 
purchase after default of the payments and forfeiture of the land 
and the money which the purchaser had paid. The Trial Court gave 
judgment for the purchaser plaintiff. The Supreme Court reviewed 
the facts carefully, including the purchase price, the amount paid, 
the value of occupancy for two years, the cost of reselling the 
property, and reversed the Trial Court, saying that the courts will 
enforce contracts of this kind unless enforcement would be "so 
unconscionable that no decent, fair minded person would view the 
ensuing result without being possessed of a profound sense of 
injustice ... . " and found no such situation in that case, quoting 
Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 428, 326 P.2d 712, 717 (1958). 
In Peck v. Judd there was an action by the vendor for 
forfeiture of property due to default, and restitution was granted. 
The Supreme Court examined all the facts carefully and confirmed 
the restitution, concluding: 
Courts of equity should not interfere 
except when sharp practice or most 
unconscionable results are to be prevented. 
See also Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P. 2d 1082 (Utah 1983) ; Morris v. Sykes, 
624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981); Gavin v. Johnson, 131 Conn. 489, 41 
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A.2d 113, 156 ALR 1130, 1137. The cases show the great latitude 
the reviewing court has in determining what is equitable. 
The benefits that the Defendant Appellees had received 
from the property were very substantial. They had occupied the 
ranch property as their home and paid no rent for 2 0 years. They 
had farmed and ranched the property and that is why the 
improvements as to buildings and sprinkling system were made. They 
had raised cattle on the property as evidenced by the records of 
sales of cattle (Ex. P-8) , including a substantial sale in 1980 for 
a bad check, which was lost, but which was not the fault of the 
Plaintiffs or George Fisher (Tr. 430, 435, 436) . They had received 
$30,000 from the Mapco contract (Tr. 458) and $12,500 in 1985 on 
the Linmar contract, which is Exhibit P-9, plus $1,000 a year from 
1985 to the time of trial (Tr. 458, 459 and 469) . 
6. Should the Court have allowed Appellants' attorney 
fees? 
The Escrow Agreement (Ex. P-l) in provision V(c) in the 
last paragraph provides: 
If any suit or action is brought to enforce 
any of the covenants herein contained, the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses of such action, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
Said Agreement on page 1 provides that the Buyers will pay $10,000 
on the 1st day of May, 1975, and a like sum on each May thereafter 
until paid in full, with interest at five percent (5%). 
The Trial Court ruled that the parties had entered into 
an oral agreement modifying this provision as to payments (R. 251-
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251 m 11, 12, 13), but there is no evidence of any oral discussion 
modifying attorney's fees. 
The Court ruled that "Plaintiff having failed on its 
Complaint is not entitled to attorneys fees." (R. 257, Ll. 21-22) 
The Court did not dismiss the Complaint and in effect 
gave judgment for $115,720 of principal and $90,740 of interest or 
a total of $206,460. On that basis, attorney's fees should be 
awarded to the Plaintiffs as the prevailing parties. The 
postponement of payments is based on what the Court found to be an 
oral agreement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Did George Fisher, Jr., now deceased, make an oral 
agreement with Appellee Max Fisher postponing payments due under 
the Escrow Agreement? The Court finds forfeiture of the ranch 
property to be inequitable and fashions as an alternative an oral 
agreement made between father and son that payments would not have 
to be made as they fell due and that at some future time, the 
father would demand payments, which would start a series of annual 
payments of $10,000 each at five percent (5%) interest until the 
total amount due would be paid, which amount with interest is 
$206,460. Such an agreement was not pleaded, was not testified to, 
and was not argued by either side, yet the Court found that it was 
within the contemplation of the parties. 
An agreement to postpone until demanded would be 
reasonable, as that would be similar to a judicial sale or 
foreclosure sale, would protect the Appellees as to value and would 
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give them a short period of time within which to pay off the 
balance. But since the payments were not forgiven and interest was 
not forgiven, the result is completely inequitable, as it would 
either never be paid off at $10,00 per year or would extend beyond 
the life or lives of the parties to the action, and would be 
payable in dollars which, according to present trends, would be 
substantially deflated, even if somehow the Congress can avoid 
national bankruptcy. 
Such an agreement was clearly not within the 
contemplation of Max Fisher. He repeatedly discussed with his 
father payments as they were falling due and without waiting for 
any demand by his father. The so-called tender of $57,100 made by 
Appellees through their attorney shows their opinion that whatever 
was due was then due and owing, and they relied on the statute of 
limitations as barring all but the last six payments of the 
original Escrow Agreement. (See Addenda P. 14) 
Such was clearly not within the contemplation of George 
Fisher, as explained to other members of his family that the 
failure of Max to pay would result in loss of the property. 
11• Was Appellant LaRue Fisher, wife of deceased George 
Fisher, Jr., bound by the actions of George Fisher, Jr.? The Court 
found that in the family relationship, the husband was allowed to 
take the lead in business affairs, despite the fact that Appellant 
LaRue Fisher did not approve of the failure of her husband to 
enforce the terms of the contract. It is plain that the 
relationship between mother and son and daughter-in-law was not 
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warm and that postponing the payments was not to LaRue Fisher's 
liking. It is admitted that she took no action on her own account 
to insist on payments because she was married to George. 
Such agency could not reasonably have gone beyond what 
LaRue Fisher was aware of, namely that her husband was not 
insisting on strict performance by the Appellee purchasers, even 
though they were constantly in default. There was no notice of any 
kind to her that there was any possibility of commencing payments 
at a later date in the amount of $10,000 per year, regardless of 
how long that payment schedule would be. 
Ill. Assuming that an oral agreement was made, is it void 
because of the statute of frauds? The issue of the statute of 
frauds was raised by the Motion to alter or amend the pleadings and 
the filing of the Memorandum urging the statute of frauds and 
including the necessity of obtaining the written approval of the 
joint tenant even if the negotiating joint tenant was in agreement. 
Actually, in our case there was no writing between the father and 
son either. 
The Court held that the statute of frauds did not apply 
to the agreement to extend the time for payments and that it 
applied only where the actual transfer of title was involved. 
Appellants submit that the trial judge ignored cases presented and 
argued and that he was in error in ignoring the statute of frauds. 
IV. Was a payment for cattle sold in 1979 properly 
allowed by the Court as a payment on the contract for the sale of 
property? All the documentary evidence before the Court showed 
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that the cattle sold in 1979 belonged to George and LaRue Fisher 
and the check did not constitute a payment on the contract. 
The agency which purchased the cattle scheduled it as 
George Fisher cattle. The record which Appellant LaRue Fisher kept 
of sales of their cattle listed this sale as their cattle. The 
record of sales of cattle kept by Appellee Joyce Fisher did not 
show this as a sale of cattle but did show other sales in that 
year. The income tax return of Defendants did not schedule this 
item as a sale of their cattle and LaRue Fisher testified that it 
was reported to their accountant as a sale of their cattle and tax 
paid on it accordingly. Appellant LaRue Fisher testified that they 
did have 70 or 80 head of milk cows left on the property for Max to 
milk for the time being and that these were some of the cattle sold 
in the 1979 sale. 
Against this testimony was the testimony of the 
Defendants that the cattle were theirs and they didn't report them 
as being their own cattle for income tax reasons, which makes them 
out to be income tax evaders. It is submitted that this oral 
testimony was not substantiated, was self-serving, was not 
sufficient to overcome the overwhelming documentary evidence, and 
testimony of LaRue Fisher. 
V. Was the remedy of forfeiture as sought by the 
Appellants inequitable under the facts before the Court? The Court 
found that it would be inequitable to permit forfeiture of the land 
because in about 1988 or 1989 Appellees had built a new house on 
the property in place of the old one, had borrowed $30,000 against 
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cattle and equipment as a means of building the house, which amount 
was still owing, and that it would be inequitable to permit 
investment of available money in improvements on the property or 
for other purposes and then suddenly demand payment. 
The Court did not consider or give any weight to the 
following factors: 
Defendants moved on to the farm in 1974 and made it their 
home, the basis of their occupation and their living from then 
forward, including substantial sales of cattle. 
The farm and ranch produced the income on which they 
lived and from which they made improvements on the property, which 
improvements made the property more productive and produced further 
income and made it more useful to them. 
Defendants realized $30,000 from Mapco in 1985, $12,500 
from Linmar in 1985, and $1,000 per year from Linmar thereafter, 
all from the property itself. 
The $30,000 borrowed against cattle and equipment was 
borrowed against things which had been purchased or produced by the 
property itself as the basis. There was no showing that the cattle 
and equipment do not still exist and cannot be liquidated to 
satisfy the $30,000 without touching the real property. 
The customary alternative to forfeiture of land is to 
give time for payment through requiring notice and a judicial sale 
or a foreclosure sale, which was the reasonable alternative in this 
case. 
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VI. Should the Court have allowed Appellants' attorney 
fees? Assuming that the Court was right in its entire decision 
except for the matter of attorneys fees, attorneys fees should 
still have been awarded as provided in the Escrow Agreement. After 
the Notice of Termination was given and the Appellees had responded 
by offering $57,100, Appellants had no alternative except to accept 
the $57,100 or file action. The action has resulted in a 
determination that a far greater amount was owing and Appellants 
have therefore succeeded in the Trial Court and attorneys fees 
should have been awarded as provided in the Escrow Agreement. 
MOJUMENT 
POINT I 
DID GEORGE FISHER, JR., NOW DECEASED, MAKE AN 
ORAL AGREEMENT WITH APPELLEE MAX FISHER POSTPONING 
PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT? 
The Complaint seeks forfeiture of the property for 
nonpayment in accordance with the Escrow Agreement. If this 
measure is inequitable, the usual alternative is to appraise the 
position of each party. If forfeiture would unreasonably benefit 
the vendor or harshly punish the purchaser, then order a plan for 
sale of the property with the proceeds over vendor's entitlement 
going to the purchaser. Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 275, 
332 P.2d 989 (1958); Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 
1977); Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 428, 327 P.2d 712 (1958); Soffe 
v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983); Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 
684 (Utah 1981). 
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This result permits realization of a fair price and if 
there is anything left over above what the vendor properly has 
coming, it goes to the purchaser. Whether forfeiture is in fact 
inequitable in this case is considered under Point V. The Trial 
Judge did find forfeiture to be inequitable (R. 258, Addenda P. 9, 
LI. 6-15)) but fashioned a unique agreement to make it easy on the 
purchasers, who are the Appellees. If the parties did agree on a 
substitute, that would be a reasonable outcome. But here neither 
party pleaded, offered evidence, or argued in favor of an agreement 
postponing the time of payments and establishing a schedule. It is 
true that formal demand was not made for the payments and 
postponing them is reasonable; but imposing on the Appellant vendor 
a never-ending schedule of payments is not only inequitable, but it 
was not the oral agreement and was not what either party 
contemplated. 
If all the parties had met together and decided that a 
payoff over say a five-year period would be satisfactory, that 
would be reasonable. But here a father was dealing with a son 
whose livelihood was farming and ranching the land being purchased 
and so long as title was retained and the price was generous to the 
purchaser, give latitude to the purchaser, who will have to pay for 
the property eventually. Interest was accruing and so were the 
payments of principal. If George Fisher had not died, the whole 
story could have been told. 
The Trial Court found that the sale of cattle in 1979 
resulted in a payment on the contract. There was then due, with 
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interest, $144,650. Payment of $24,980 left $15,720 principal and 
unpaid interest of $3,950. With no payments until 1994, additional 
interest was $86,790 or a total of $206,460. At $10,000 per year 
and 5% interest, that would never pay off. Not compounding that 
huge interest debt would be grossly unfair to the vendors; but even 
if that were ordered, it would take 39-1/2 years to pay it off. 
There is absolutely no evidence that George Fisher or Max 
Fisher ever contemplated any such future for the property or the 
family. 
Max Fisher testified that in 1975 (Tr. 395) , in 1979 (Tr. 
407, 447, 452) and in either 1988 or 1989 (Tr. 419) , he had conver-
sations with his father about the payments that were then due and 
testified that the father did not insist on payment and suggested 
that the money be put into the property for improvements or to 
build the house. Under the Escrow Agreement (Ex. 1, Provision 
5(c), third paragraph): 
The Buyers agree that the Sellers may, at 
their option, reenter and take possession of 
said premises without legal process as in its 
first and former estate, together with all 
improvements and additions made by the Buyers 
thereon, and the said additions and 
improvements shall remain with the land and 
become the property of the Sellers ... . 
The improvements being made were presumably to make the property 
more productive, thereby benefitting the Buyers during the 18-year 
interest term and benefitting the Sellers only if the Sellers' 
ultimate use of the property would prove that the improvements made 
were useful and valuable, on which there was absolutely no 
evidence. It is obvious that the conversations dealt only with the 
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then current payment or the matter would not have come up 
repeatedly for further consideration. Plainly there was no such 
agreement in the mind of Max Fisher and his attorney when they 
responded to the Notice of Termination by writing their letter to 
Paul J. Barton (Ex. D6) . That letter assumes that all payments are 
due and that all except those within six years have been barred by 
the statute of limitations. The amortization schedule attached as 
Addenda 14 shows that the original principal balance of $115,720 
would be paid in 17 payments plus the final payment of $7,100. In 
1994 only the last five plus $7,100 were within the six-year 
statute of limitations, of which Exhibit D6 is an acknowledgement 
and also an acknowledgement that all payments were past due. 
Furthermore, speculation is not necessary as to what 
George Fisher, Jr. had in mind in not forcing his son to pay 
promptly the payments as they became due. This was discussed with 
Appellant LaRue Fisher (Tr. 551, Ll. 16-24); Kim M. Fisher, a son 
of George and LaRue (Tr. 571, Ll. 20-24); Susan Fisher Thacker, 
daughter of George and LaRue Fisher (Tr. 588, L. 7) ; and Peggy 
Fisher, a daughter-in-law (Tr. 595, Ll. 23-25) . These 
conversations made plain the fact that George Fisher was letting 
his son Max Fisher decide whether to make the payments as they came 
due or use the money otherwise and ultimately be compelled either 
to pay up or lose the property. 
Witnesses called by the Defendants testified that George 
Fisher was not insisting on immediate payment (James J. Oman, Tr. 
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526, LI. 14-25; Phillip J. Timothy, Tr. 519, Ll. 18-24 and 520, LL. 
2-12) . 
Appellants have no particular objection to designating 
the relief as an agreement to postpone payments as they came due as 
the basis for an alternative to forfeiture, and as a substitute to 
the usual alternative of ordering a sale of the property; but 
forcing Appellants into a never-ending or 39-1/2 year payoff plan 
with probable increase of inflation is just not supportable as 
being within the contemplation of the parties on the testimony 
given. 
POINT II 
WAS APPELLANT LARUE FISHER, 
WIFE OF DECEASED GEORGE FISHER, JR., 
BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF GEORGE FISHER, IK ? 
Under the paragraph numbered 18 in his Decision, the 
Trial Judge analyzed the relationship between George and LaRue 
Fisher, recognizing that "The relationship between the spouses is 
also important." (R. 254, L. 15, Addenda P. 6) He then found: 
If there was ever a disagreement, George's 
opinion predominated. George was strong 
willed and decisive. It was George who ran 
and operated the dairy and the ranch. Prior 
to selling the farm, George was the one who 
made the business decisions which related to 
the farm. (R. 254, Ll. 18-20, Addenda P. 6) 
And again: 
Where there was disagreement, LaRue acquiesced 
to the will of George. This is seen in their 
disagreement over the payments. LaRue clearly 
wanted the payments to be made. She discussed 
this subject often with George but could not 
get him to take action. Instead of taking 
independent action, she submitted to his will. 
(R. 254, Ll. 22-24, Addenda P. 6) 
This last sentence is significant. LaRue could not take 
independent action without fracturing her relationship with her 
husband and the same thing applied to George. Actually, since they 
were joint tenants, neither one could bind the other. Since they 
had different views as to what should be done, it was not possible 
for either one to make a binding decision for both. 
The Court went on to say: 
Although her other children knew of her 
feelings about the payments, they did not 
advise independent action on her part to 
collect the debt. Instead, they worked on 
their father to try to get him to change his 
mind. ... She also certainly knew that 
payments had not been made during the term of 
the contract. ... It is very apparent that 
George didn't want trouble between he and his 
son, and LaRue didn't want trouble between her 
and her husband- . . . The Court also believes 
that LaRue knew that George had authorized 
some kind of delay in the payments. (R. 255, 
LI. 1-3, 5-6, 10-11, 12-13, Addenda P. 7) 
These findings by the Court are supported by the testimony. See 
Tr. 395, 419, 477, 551, 573, 591, 526, 531, 519-520. 
It was therefore plain that LaRue did not agree with 
postponement of the payments and if it was known to her other 
children and to her husband, it must also have been known to Max 
and Joyce, with whom the relationship was not warm (Tr. 431, 432-
433, 434, 460-461, 550-552, 611). 
It is true that LaRue was aware of the fact that payments 
were not being made and that George was responsible for the delay. 
However, there is not one word of testimony that could indicate to 
LaRue Fisher that there was in the making the possibility that when 
demand was made, it would not be for the past due payments but 
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would mark the beginning of a completely new schedule of payments 
at $10,000 per year and 5% interest on the entire principal plus 
unpaid interest. 
LaRue Fisher testified that she demanded the payments of 
Max on at least two occasions before George passed away (Tr. 354, 
LI. 4-10, 20-25; 360, Ll. 8-20; 359, Ll. 9-3). This was denied by 
Max Fisher and Joyce Fisher (Tr. 434, 435, 422, 424). Since the 
only other witness to the conversations, namely George Fisher, was 
deceased, it seems reasonable that since LaRue Fisher stated the 
place and the circumstances of both conversations, her recollection 
was reliable and consistent with the other facts and circumstances. 
It is important to recognize the fact that LaRue Fisher 
was married to George Fisher and keeping the marriage together was 
important. That explains why she did no more than was actually 
done to make definite the position of the parties. Shepick v. 
Shepick, 44 Utah 131, 137, 138 P. 1169; Godfried vs. Munson, 597 
P.2d 885 (Utah 1979); Chandler v. Jackson, 714 P.2d 477 (Ariz. App. 
1986) . 
POINT 1 IT 
ASSUMING THAT AN ORAL AGREEMENT WAS MADE, 
IS IT VOID BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS? 
The Court ruled that the statute of frauds did not apply 
because "The modification did not concern any issue dealing with 
title to the property. The modification came after Buyer had 
entered into possession and began to perform under the contract. 
The modification was limited to the timing of payments only. It 
did not change the amount due. The contract was partially 
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performed, and the defendant relied upon the oral representations." 
(R. 257-258, % 23) Appellants submit this is a question of law and 
the opinion of the Trial Judge is entitled to no deference. 
The Motion to Amend the Reply and answer the Counterclaim 
argued that the statute of frauds prevented any binding of 
Appellant LaRue Fisher despite the representations of her husband 
(R. 173-174) . Actually, the statute of frauds applies also to the 
husband's position. The Memorandum filed with the Court (R. 176-
178) assumed that the Court might find the husband committed by 
estoppel but that that would not apply to the wife, who was a joint 
tenant, as is the case here, quoting from Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 
Utah 2d 39, 465 P. 2d 365. The Court had referred to the Coombs v. 
Ouzounian case (misspelled in the record) as not being applicable 
to the facts of this case. The Court referred to the Ouzounian 
case in responding to an objection made by Plaintiffs' attorney 
that testimony of conversations by Max Fisher with the deceased 
were not admissible in the absence of LaRue Fisher because of the 
statute of frauds, which the Court discussed and overruled the 
objection (Tr. 389-391). 
In Coombs v. Ouzounian, supra, a husband and wife, joint 
tenants, had entered into an option to purchase their land. The 
husband had extended the option in writing and alone. The Court 
held that under the statute of frauds, the extension was not valid. 
In the closing argument counsel for Appellants cited co 
the Court Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1986), as 
holding that any modification of a material portion of a contract 
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is within the statute of frauds, which the Trial Court rejected 
because it didn't apply to our case (Tr. 620-622). 
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1986), 
included a sale for a house which was modified by an oral agreement 
that the vendor would paint the front of the home as a reduction of 
the price of sale. The Court held that this oral agreement was 
within the statute of frauds and was void, with this statement: 
Nor were the buyers entitled to rescind 
the earnest money agreement because of the 
sellers' failure to paint the front of the 
home as promised. Cf. Thackeray v. Knight, 57 
Utah at 27-28, 192 P. at 266 (buyer's oral 
rescission of contract for sale of land was 
valid when seller breached contract). The 
rule is well settled in Utah that if the 
original agreement is within the statute of 
frauds, a subsequent agreement that modifies 
any of the material parts of the original must 
also satisfy the statute. Golden Key Realty, 
Inc. v. Mantas, 669 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985). 
Zion's Properties v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 
1975) , involves an oral agreement to reduce payments until personal 
property had been moved from the property, which was held to be 
void because it was not in writing. The Court said: 
It is elementary that when a contract is 
required to be in writing, the same 
requirement applies with equal force to any 
alteration or modification thereof. 
Appellants submit that the oral conversation which George 
Fisher, Jr. had with Max Fisher was a modification of the written 
Escrow Agreement and was not binding, because it was not in writing 
and signed by the parties. If it should be held that George Fisher 
should be estopped because Max Fisher relied on the oral statement, 
that still would not cover the joint tenant LaRue fisher, who made 
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no such statement and from whom no writing was obtained and no 
consent was solicited. 
POINT IV 
WAS A PAYMENT FOR CATTLE SOLD IN 1979 
PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE COURT AS A PAYMENT 
ON THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF PROPERTY? 
The Trial Court regarded this as a close question and 
resolved it on the basis that the recollection of Max Fisher was 
clearer than the recollection cf LaRue Fisher (R. 257, Addenda P. 
9, LI. 2-4). 
The position of Plaintiffs is based upon the documentary 
evidence plus the recollection of LaRue Fisher that the sale was of 
their cattle and it was so treated, and no question arose as to 
whose cattle they were until this lawsuit. On the other hand, Max 
Fisher along with his wife Joyce took the position that the cattle 
belonged to them and tried to talk around all the evidence which 
was made at the time of the sale, and in none of which was there 
any indication that Max and Joyce claimed the cattle to be theirs. 
The record of cattle sold kept by LaRue Fisher (Ex. P-12, 
P-6) showed a sale of 26 Holstein cattle in 1979 for $24,986 (the 
writing is not very plain and could be $24,900 even). She 
testified that these were their cattle (Tr. 481) . She also 
testified that this sale of cattle was reported to their accountant 
as a sale of their cattle and was so reported on their income tax 
return (Tr. 493). On the other hand, the records of cattle sold 
kept by Joyce Fisher (Ex. P-8) showed sales of cattle in 1979 
totaling $21,007.75 and did not show any sale of cattle for $24,980 
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or any sale of cattle for $58,000, about which she and her husband 
Max testified (Tr. 480, 403) . Max testified that the check was 
made out to George to avoid income tax questions (Tr. 447). Joyce 
Fisher testified that she reported to their accountant cattle sales 
of $58,000 and $21,000, but doesn't know whether they reported a 
sale of $24,980 (Tr. 493-494, 495). 
LaRue Fisher testified that she and her husband left 70 
or 8 0 cows on the farm for Max to milk and these 2 6 head 
represented the sale of some of them (Tr. 557, 564). Max Fisher 
testified that George and LaRue left only 12 to 14 head (Tr. 608) . 
We submit that the documentary evidence made when there 
was no issue between the parties all shows that this was a sale of 
George Fisher's cattle. It is confirmed by the sworn testimony of 
LaRue Fisher and we submit that the Defendants have manufactured a 
story for selfish reasons and that the overwhelming weight of 
authority is against the Trial Court's finding on this issue. 
POINT V 
WAS THE REMEDY OF FORFEITURE AS 
SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS INEQUITABLE 
UNDER THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT? 
The Trial Court found that an agreement had been made by 
George Fisher and Max Fisher in behalf of themselves and their 
wives postponing payments on the contract. That occupies the first 
part of the Court's ten-page Memorandum Decision (Addenda P. 3-4). 
Then, apparently in justification of that holding, the Trial Court 
discussed why the Defendants did not want to forfeit the property 
and held that it would be inequitable (Addenda P. 4 % 13 and 14). 
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This probably was done to avoid a question on the statute of 
limitations (Addenda P. 5, Ll. 1-4) and also to show that he was 
trying to be fair. He found that the Defendants had built a home 
to replace the original one on the property, had borrowed $30,000 
to do it, that the annual payments which they could have made had 
been invested in the property, and it would now be unfair to make 
them dig up the payments (Addenda P. 4 K 13). 
The Court did not give any weight to the fact that the 
Defendants had occupied the 600 acre ranch and farm for twenty 
years, had made their living from it by farming, by milking cows 
and by selling cattle, had received $30,000 from Mapco because of 
infringement on the property and $12,500 from Linmar plus $1,000 a 
year for nine years for use of part of the undesirable portion of 
the ranch (Ex. P-9, Tr. 459) , and that they had been able to make 
enough money from their operations on the property to invest in 
cattle and equipment against which they borrowed $30,000 to rebuild 
the house, which cattle and equipment are presumably still theirs 
and are removable. Making improvements on the property would have 
made it more productive and would enable them to make more money 
from their operations, with no showing that those improvements, 
although they pass with the property under the Escrow Agreement, 
have substantial value at the present time. 
In addition, the Court did not take into account the fact 
that the failure of the Defendants to pay had become a sore spot in 
family relations. All the family members, even Max and Joyce, 
testified that the relationship between Max and Joyce and Max's 
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mother, LaRue, had become strained, the reason apparently being 
that Max resented LaRue's insistence on payment and the other 
family members regarded their father, George Fisher, as being too 
soft with Max. 
All of these factors should have been weighed and should 
now be weighed by this Court. See Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 
272, 275, 332 P.2d 989 (1958); Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 428, 
327 P.2d 712 (1958); Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983); 
Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981); and Gavin v. 
Johnson, 131 Conn. 489, 41 A.2d 113, 156 ALR 1130, 1137. 
If it is inequitable to forfeit the property outright, 
the proper alternative, according to those cases, is a provision to 
have the property sold, giving the Defendants a chance to buy or to 
sell the property and retain anything above what is owed on the 
contract. A case in point is Hale v. Whitlock, 92 N.M. 657, 593 
P. 2d 754. In that case there had been a default in the payments on 
a real estate contract where the Court weighed the equities, 
concluded that outright forfeiture would be inequitable, and gave 
the purchasers an additional fifteen days after entry of judgment 
to pay off the entire contract balance plus interest and attorneys 
fees. The vendor appealed the case, but the case was affirmed. In 
that case: 
The original seller did not object to the 
failure to make payments and Appellees were 
led to believe that prompt payment of twelve 
monthly installments per year would not be 
insisted upon. ... Soon after Appellants 
purchased the real estate contract from the 
original seller, however, Appellants demanded 
that Appellees bring their payments up to date 
by tendering $1,675 for 25 delinquent 
installments. Shortly thereafter Appellees 
brought this declaratory action. 
Appellants contend that the Court erred 
in giving Appellees additional time to pay off 
the entire contract balance after declaring 
the contract to be in default. (Pg. 754) 
The Court ruled that: 
Under the facts in this case, the trial 
court properly exercised its equity 
jurisdiction in granting Appellees additional 
time within which to pay off the entire 
balance due under the real estate contract 
along with interest and attorney fees. (Pg. 
755) 
Strict foreclosure of property under a real estate 
contract may be justified rather than the alternative of judicial 
sale where the facts support it. In Vista Management vs. Cooper, 
81 Ore.App. 660, 726 P.2d 974, 977, 978 (1986), the purchaser had 
paid $5,000 down on a $47,300 contract where the land had increased 
in value substantially. The court found that the purchaser had 
been negligent in not keeping up its payments and therefore 
justified strict foreclosure. 
The Plaintiffs ask this Court to weigh the equities, 
consider the family relationship, consider the impossible payoff if 
a judgment compounds interest and a 39-1/2-year payoff if no 
interest on interest is allowed, coupled with the declining value 
of the dollar, and then determine that the result imposed by the 
Trial Court was inequitable. 
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POINT VI 
SHOULD THE COURT HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS' ATTORNEY FEES? 
There can be no doubt that Appellants had to bring this 
matter to a head by giving Notice of Termination, since suing for 
the payments would have faced the statute of limitations. The 
Court attempted to avoid the issue of the statute of limitations by 
devising an oral agreement made between George Fisher and Max 
Fisher and then ruled that under that agreement, the payments were 
not due until a demand was made and then only one payment was due 
and that for that reason the Appellants had failed and were not 
entitled to attorneys fees. 
Appellants have succeeded in their action because under 
the Court's ruling, $115,720 of principal plus $90,740 of interest 
is now owing and the Defendants denied that there was anything 
owing. Under the Escrow Agreement, Appellants are entitled to 
their attorneys fees to enforce the agreement (Ex. P-l, Provision 
V(c) last paragraph). 
Following the service of the Notice of Termination, the 
Defendants wrote a letter saying they owed $57,100. After the 
filing of the Complaint, Defendants could have tendered $57,100 
into Court as the amount owing on the contract. Thereupon, 
Appellants could have pursued the lawsuit to show that the tender 
was inadequate and could have prevailed and would have been 
entitled to attorneys fees. If Plaintiffs had failed in the 
lawsuit, they would probably have had to pay Defendants' attorney 
fees. Instead, Defendants chose to answer and counterclaim their 
positions, all of which has failed, and the Trial Court has 
conceived an oral agreement of modification, which was not urged by 
either party and was not pleaded, and has ruled that Plaintiffs 
have failed under the Court's conceived agreement and therefore are 
not entitled to attorneys fees. This is a conclusion of law to be 
reviewed by this Court for correctness under the cases cited under 
Points I, III and IV. 
In Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah 1983), vendor 
sued for possession after default in payments under a uniform real 
estate contract, seeking to forfeit all payments made and attorney 
fees. The trial court sustained a counterclaim for return of the 
money paid to vendor, less vendor's damage such as interest or 
rental value. The court granted relief as in the counterclaim and 
denied attorney fees to vendor. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld 
the relief as in the counterclaim but held that attorney services 
were necessary and reversed as to denial of attorney fees, holding: 
There is no question in the instant case that 
the buyers defaulted and the seller was 
warranted in bringing this action to seek 
possession and to terminate the contract. 
Buyers' default made necessary a determination 
of what amounts seller should return. 
Provisions in written contracts providing for 
the payment of attorney's fees should 
ordinarily be honored by the courts. 
Management Services v. Development Associates, 
Utah, 617 P.2d 406 (1900). We think this is 
true in the instant case where no compelling 
reasons appear otherwise as we found in 
Fullman v. Blood, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The theory of Plaintiffs' Complaint was that the 
Defendants were in default for having failed to make any payments 
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on the contract except the down payment. The Defendants pleaded 
statute of limitations, adverse possession, estoppel, laches, and 
payment. In response the Plaintiffs pleaded the statute of frauds 
as making meaningless conversations between Max Fisher and his 
father as being both not trustworthy, because self-serving by Max 
Fisher, and in violation of the statute of frauds. The position of 
the Defendants during the trial was that George Fisher had not 
insisted on payments and that the defenses of estoppel and laches 
were therefore available in addition to the statute of limitations. 
The Trial Court found no evidence of adverse possession, 
did find one payment, which the Plaintiffs strongly challenge, 
namely the cattle check in 1979 made out to George Fisher, did not 
discuss estoppel or laches, found against the Plaintiffs on the 
statute of frauds, and then created an agreement not pleaded, 
testified to, or argued by either party that an agreement between 
father and son somehow bound the wives and made an oral agreement 
in the face of disagreement by the wife LaRue Fisher and in 
violation of the statute of frauds. 
Our Brief attempts to analyze and disagree with the 
Decision of the Trial Court in the way the Court concluded the 
matter. We think the proper disposition should be that the statute 
of frauds prevented the making of any binding agreement against the 
wishes of the joint tenant LaRue Fisher, who was never approached 
by the Defendants as to her position, who was always opposed to the 
latitude being given, and who took a firm stand as soon as her 
husband has passed away. 
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If this Court upholds ignoring the statute of frauds and 
in spite of the lack of pleadings and evidence looks to see whether 
an oral agreement was made between George Fisher and Max Fisher, 
then we submit it is plain that there was no agreement ever 
discussed or considered by George Fisher and Max Fisher that at 
some future time, when a demand would be made, payments of $10,000 
per year would start and all the delay and accumulation of payments 
and interest would be ignored. This result was not the agreement 
of the parties, was not the case that was tried, and would result 
in a most unreasonable and inequitable long period of payments 
beyond the lives of any of the parties, and with cheap dollars as 
a constant sore spot between members of the family, of which the 
Defendants took advantage for many years because the father could 
not bring himself to make an unwilling son live up to his contract. 
Appellants urge: First, that the judgment be reversed on 
the ground that the statute of frauds prevented any agreement or 
any concession by the joint tenant LaRue Fisher. Second, that the 
equities should be addressed and determined by this Court and 
either order forfeiture of the property or give a reasonable time 
for the Defendants to come up with the money that is owed, followed 
by either forfeiture or judicial sale. Third, this Court should 
hold that there is no substantial evidence to support the 1979 
cattle sale as being a payment on the contract, all the documentary 
evidence showing that the cattle sold belonged to George and LaRue 
Fisher. Fourth, attorneys fees should be allowed to the Appellants 
in the Trial Court and in this Court, as they have properly pursued 
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their rights under the Escrow Agreement, with no other reasonable 
alternative because of the refusal of Defendants to abide by the 
contract. 
DATED this 3rd day of March, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY 
INTER VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST; 
LaRUE FISHER, individually; 
LaRUE FISHER, Settlor and 
Trustee of The George Fisher, 
Jr. Family Inter Vivos 
Revocable Trust Agreement; and 
BRENT ELMER FISHER, Co-Trustee 
of The George Fisher, Jr. 
Family Inter Vivos Revocable 
Trust Agreement, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
Max GEORGE FISHER and JOYCE 
FISHER, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 930800065PR 
JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE 
DECISION 
-0O0-
THE COURT: This matter came before the undersigned 
for trial on August 24th, 1994. Based upon the evidence, the 
Court finds and concludes as follows: 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter of this action. 
2. The Court has now considered the defendant's 
motion to dismiss which was made at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's case. Based upon the evidence which was then 
before the Court and viewing such evidence in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that the plaintiff 
did introduce sufficient evidence to prevail as against this 
motion. The Court has also reviewed the pleadings and rules 
that the pleadings do not raise the issue of whether the 
notice was defective for failure to specify a particular 
amount due. The escrow agreement does not require the Seller 
to set forth a specific amount due in the notice. The 
agreement only requires that the escrow agent be notified of 
the amount due and then gives the escrow agent an option to 
send a copy of this notice to the buyer. The Court rules that 
the tender which the defendants made in this matter was 
defective. It was defective for two reasons: First, there 
was never any showing that the Sellers would have rejected the 
money had it actually been tendered and, therefore, there is 
no shp^ing that such a tender would have been futile. Second, 
EIGHTH DISTRICT ..-OU*. 
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based upon the Court's findings and the conclusions which will 
be more fully set forth below, the amount which was tendered 
was not sufficient to fully perform the buyer's obligations 
under the contract. 
3. George and LaRue Fisher (hereinafter George and 
LaRue) are husband and wife. Max and Joyce Fisher 
(hereinafter Max and Joyce) are husband and wife and Max is 
the son of George and LaRue. On or about May 1st, 1994, 
George and LaRue (as Sellers) conveyed to Max and Joyce 
(as Buyers) approximately 600 acres of land pursuant to a 
written escrow agreement (hereinafter contract). The purchase 
price was $124,000, and Buyers paid $8,280 as a down payment. 
The contract called for yearly annual payments of $10,000 
beginning May 1st, 1975. Interest was payable at the annual 
rate of 5 percent. 
4. Buyers entered into the possession on or about 
May 1st, 1974, and have enjoyed possession of the property 
through the date of the trial. Buyers entered into possession 
by reason of the privileges and rights granted under the 
contract. There was no possession which was at any time 
adverse to the Sellers. Therefore, the Court concludes that 
adverse possession has not been established. 
5. The only issue with respect to the Buyers' 
obligation under the contract which Lhe Sellers rely upon to 
establish a breach of the contract is the payment obligation. 
Buyers have entered into the property and performed all other 
obligations as required under the contract. 
6. The agreement provides that upon default by the 
Buyers the Sellers may terminate the contract by serving a 30 
day notice upon the Buyers. Upon failure to cure any breach 
within 30 days, the interest of the Buyers was to be 
terminated and the Buyers' interest in the property was to be 
forfeited to the Sellers. The agreement also provides that 
the defaulting party pay cost and expenses to enforce the 
agreement including a reasonable attorney fee. 
7. On or about October 10th, 1975, George and 
LaRue signed a trust agreement. The property which was the 
subject of the escrow agreement which has been referred to 
above was included in land which was quitclaimed to the trust 
in order to fund the trust. This quitclaim deed was recorded 
with the Duchesne County recorder's office. George and LaRue 
were the initial trustees of the trust. Upon the death of 
either of the initial trustees, Max and his brother, Brent 
Fisher, were to serve as successor trustees together with the 
survivor of the original trustees. George died April 18th, 
1992, and Max, Brent, and LaRue have served as trustees since 
that time. 
8. Max was present with his brothers and sister 
and parents at a meeting held at an attorney's office where 
the trust was discussed. Max was aware of the creation of the 
2 
1 trust and that he was named as a successor trustee. However, 
there was no evidence that he ever read the trust document or 
2 that he was aware of the specific property which was 
transferred to the trust. 
3 9. No additional documents have been prepared to 
assign the seller's rights under the contract to the trust. 
4 Max and Joyce were never notified that they should make 
payments to the trust, and they have not been aware that the 
5 creation of the trust affected their obligations under the 
contract. With respect to the contract, after the trust was 
6 created and signed, nothing further occurred which would have 
formally notified Max and Joyce that the property had been 
7 transferred to the trust. 
10. When the parties dealt with the contract and 
8 property after the contract date, they never referred to the 
trust or purported to act as trustees. Based upon the record, 
9 the Court concludes that the Buyers were never notified and 
did not have actual notice that they were obligated to perform 
10 their contract duties to the trust, therefore, the Buyers were 
entitled to continue to deal with George and LaRue in their 
11 individual capacities rather than in their capacities as 
trustees of the trust. 
12 As hereinafter set forth, the Court finds that the 
contract was modified by the parties prior to the quitclaim 
13 deed, therefore, to the extent that the trust is involved, the 
Court concludes that the contract had been modified prior to 
14 creation of the trust, and that each party is bound by the 
modified agreement. 
15 11. During the term of the agreement the parties 
had several discussions concerning annual payments. The first 
16 such discussion was prior to the creation of the trust and 
prior to the date the first annual payment was due. This 
17 discussion concerned whether or not the Buyers should make 
annual payments. At that time and at all times thereafter, 
18 whenever a payment was due, Max and Joyce either had the money 
to make the annual payment or they had an ability to obtain 
19 the money from their bank. When this matter was first 
discussed in the spring of 1975, George told Max that he 
20 J should not make his payment but should invest his payment 
monies to improve the property. George indicated that he did 
21 | not then need the money and that Max should continue to 
improve the property. George indicated that he would notify 
22 | Max when he should begin making payments. There was no 
discussion of forgiveness of any portion of the debt and no 
23 | discussion that payments were to be treated as gifts. Based 
upon the contract and the discussion between the parties, the 
24 | Court concludes that there was, in fact, no forgiveness of any 
portion of the debt at any time nor were the payments to be 
25 | treated as gifts. 
George clearly indicated that Max and Joyce would 
1 not be expected to make their yearly payments. In reliance 
upon this discussion, Max and Joyce invested their money by 
2 improving the property rather than making their annual 
payments. During the term of the agreement, these investments 
3 took the form of purchasing and installing sprinkler pipes, 
building numerous structures and outbuildings, building and 
4 improving retention ponds, leveling and clearing land, the 
construction of a home upon the property and in general, 
5 improving the land. Based upon the evidence, the Court finds 
that the improvements to the land which were made as a result 
6 of not making payments are substantial and have resulted in a 
substantial increase in the value of the land. Based upon the 
7 evidence, the Court concludes that the contract was modified 
by agreement between the parties so that contract payments 
8 were delayed, but not forgiven. 
12. In 1980 or 1981, Max and George again had a 
9 conversation concerning payments, Jerry Carol was present 
during this conversation. Again, payments were discussed. 
10 Again, George instructed Max not to make payments to him but 
to continue to invest the yearly installment payments into 
11 improvements on the property. 
13. In 1988 or 1989, the old home which had been 
12 upon the property when it was purchased became unusable 
because of a cracked foundation. It was, therefore, necessary 
13 for Max and Joyce to either build, buy, or rent a home. Max 
and Joyce could not then afford to make their yearly 
14 installment payments, should they become due, and also build a 
home. George was aware of Max and Joyce's financial 
15 situation, and George instructed them to build a new home. As 
a consequence, Max and Joyce built a new home and financed it 
16 by pledging their cattle and equipment as security. If 
forfeiture is ordered in this case, the Sellers would 
17 therefore receive the new home free of any encumbrance while 
the Buyers would continue to be liable for the mortgage which 
18 is now approximately $30,000. 
14. Nothing was said in any of the above 
19 discussions about forgiving the yearly payments or treating 
the yearly payments as gifts. As payments became due, Max and 
20 Joyce relied upon the various statements of George and 
invested their money in the property. If forfeiture is 
21 ordered, the Sellers would not only receive the land, but they 
would receive the value of the yearly payments which George 
22 had instructed Max to invest in the property. It seems 
extremely unjust to the Court to allow George to instruct the 
23 Buyers not to make payments and then allow a forfeiture based 
upon the reliance of the Buyers in not making payments. 
24 15. On March 5th, 1993, a "notice of termination 
of agreement" was sent to the Sellers by the Buyers. Prior to 
25 that time, neither George nor LaRue had demanded that yearly 
payments begin according to the written contract. 
The Court relies upon the testimony of Max that hi 
mother first asked for payments about a year after his father 
died. George died April 18, 1992. Arguably, the request to 
make payments could have occurred prior to the notice. The 
Court believes that it did not. Nevertheless, even assuming 
that LaRue requested payments prior to the notice, the yearly 
payments were not due until May 1, 1993. Therefore, the 
notice proceeded any default in payment. 
16. The relationship between the various parties 
is of considerable importance in resolving this case. The 
parties to the contract are related by blood and/or marriage. 
This accounts for the fact that records were not kept after 
the contract was signed. Max and Joyce claim credit for 
approximately $10,000 for materials and equipment which they 
believe George picked up from the ranch over the contract 
period. Max and Joyce also claim that the Sellers received 
$24,980 from the sale of cattle which belonged to them 
(Max and Joyce). Both parties claim that certain 
conversations occurred. However, none of these conversations 
or transactions were documented in writing. 
George and LaRue were in disagreement with respect 
to the payments. George had told Max that payments need not 
be made. He indicated to LaRue and other family members thai: 
he did not want to "get into it" with Max over the payments. 
LaRue, on the other hand, always felt that Max and Joyce 
should pay their payments in full. This was a frequent source 
of disagreement between George and LaRue as can be seen from 
the number of persons who overheard such discussions between 
the couple. 
Similarly, Joyce and Max were not of one mind about 
how the payments were to be handled. Max told Joyce that his 
father had told him to put payments into the property. She 
wanted this put in writing and signed by George. However, her 
husband told her that it would not be necessary to do so. 
It is obvious that the failure of the parties to 
handle this agreement in a formal business-like manner was due 
to the relationship of the parties which relationship was 
relied upon rather than creating a formal written 
documentation. Indeed, the Court believes that the parties 
each felt like it would have been an indication that they 
didn't trust the other party if they would have required 
written documentation. 
17. In 1988 or 1989, Max and Joyce were 
contemplating building a new home. Max testified that at that 
time he knew he was still obligated to make payments under the 
contract:. He testified that this was the reason for his 
conversation with his dad, wherein his dad (George) indicated 
that he should build the home rather than pay the payments. 
If Max would have believed that his father had forgiven 
payments he would have had no reason to be concerned about 
5 
1 making payments at that time. At that time, no demand for 
payments had been made. George had previously told his son 
2 that he would ask for payments when he needed them. 
Nevertheless, as an indication that Max knew he still owed the 
3 payments, he contacted his father and obtained further 
assurances that payments would not be required in view of his 
4 need to build a home. Also, in 1979, Max maintains that he 
sold some of his cattle and the proceeds went to George and 
5 LaRue. This is a further indication that there was no 
agreement to forgive debt or to treat payments as gifts. All 
6 of this leads the Court to conclude that no agreement was ever 
made nor did the seller or buyer ever agree to forgive debts 
7 or to treat payments as gifts. 
Buyers rely upon various statements of George that 
8 payments need not be made as a basis for claiming that these 
payments are not due. The evidence indicates that the 
9 agreement between the parties in 1975, that is the oral 
agreement, was merely to delay payments rather than to forgive 
10 payments. Of course, this finding affects the defendant's 
position on the statute of limitations. The statute does not 
11 begin to run until a breach has occurred in the contract. 
Here the parties had mutually agreed to delay payment until 
12 the seller requested payment. No request was made until 1993. 
Therefore, the statute did not begin to run until 1993. Under 
13 the Court's finding of fact, no payments are affected by the 
statute of limitations. 
14 18. As stated earlier, the relationship between 
the parties is important in considering this case. Not only 
15 is the parent/sibbling relationship important but the 
relationship between the spouses is also important. 
16 George and LaRue: LaRue has testified that no 
decisions were ever made without her input. She testified 
17 that when making decisions, they (George and LaRue), always 
made them together. While it may be true that they always 
18 discussed these decisions, it is very clear to the Court that 
if there was ever e disagreement, George's opinion 
19 predominated. Geor 3 was strong willed and decisive. It was 
George who ran and operated the dairy and the ranch. Prior to 
20 selling the farm, George was the one who made the business 
decisions which related to the farm. 
21 The Court is convinced that the agreement and 
modification were each negotiated entirely between George and 
22 Max. Where there was disagreement, LaRue acquiesced to the 
will of George. This is seen in their disagreement over the 
23 payments. LaRue clearly wanted the payments to be made. She 
discussed this subject often with George but could not get him 
24 to take action. Instead of taking independent action, she 
submitted to his will. She did not take any action prior to 
25 his death and, indeed, not until March of 1993. Her 
predisposition to submit to her husband's will was well known 
to her children. Although her other children knew of her 
feelings about the payments, they did not advise independent 
action on her part to collect the debt. Instead, they worked 
on their father to try to get him to change his mind. Within 
the entire family, it was well known that at least with 
respect to business decisions, George was calling the shots. 
Finally, LaRue was aware that Max and others (including her 
other children) believed that when George spoke in these 
matters he spoke for her. She also certainly knew that 
payments had not been made during the term of the contract. 
Under these circumstances, the Court believes that Max 
reasonably believed that when his father spoke he spoke for 
both of his parents. 
LaRue had allowed George to be spokesman. She knew 
that others viewed George as their spokesman when it came to 
business matters. And she allowed this to occur even when she 
was in disagreement as to the decision which had been reached. 
It is very apparent that George didn't want trouble between he 
and his son, and LaRue didn't want trouble between her and her 
husband. So she didn't take any action and neither did they. 
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that LaRue is 
also bound by the representations of George with respect to 
the payments. The Court also believes that LaRue knew that 
George had authorized some kind of delay in the payments. 
Max and Joyce: The relationship between Max and 
Joyce was in all respects similar to the relationship of 
George and LaRue. When there was a disagreement, Max's 
opinion predominated, at least in business matters. Max ran 
the farm and made the business decisions relating to the farm. 
Joyce acquiesced when there was a conflict relating to the 
farm. She was aware that Max and George had agreed to 
postpone payments and wanted this in writing. Max disagreed, 
believing that, between father and son, it was unnecessary to 
memorialize an agreement in writing. Max's opinion always 
predominated in these matters. Like LaRue, Joyce was aware 
that when Max spoke he spoke for both of them. She was 
certainly aware of all conversations between Max and George. 
She knew that payments had been postponed and that monies had 
been invested in the property. She did not believe that these 
payments had been forgiven or gifted. Under these 
circumstances, she is also bound by the agreement to postpone 
payments. 
19. In this matter there has been much testimony 
about the desire and practice of George and LaRue to make 
gifts to their children. It is clear that Max and Joyce 
expected that they would receive gifts from their parents. 
They did, in fact, receive payments of $12,500 from Linmar and 
$30,000 from Mapco, for easements. Without deciding whether 
these were gifts (as LaRue has testified), it is apparent that 
under the circumstances of this case, it was necessary for the 
7 
1 Sellers to agree that this money would go to the Buyers. 
There was no record of the Buyers' interest in the property 
2 filed with the county recorder's office. Under these 
circumstances, Sellers certainly may have required that all or 
3 a portion of the payments be applied against the contract 
price. Nevertheless, as previously indicated, there is no 
4 specific testimony that either George or LaRue ever indicated 
that any of the payments would be gifts. 
5 20. As previously stated, Max and Joyce continued 
to believe that they were obligated under the contract. In 
6 response to the notice which they received in 1993, they 
caused their attorney to offer $57,100 as full payment under 
7 the contract. In their calculations to reach the amount due, 
they sought to offset the payments which they believed they 
8 had made ($24,980 for cattle in 1979, $10,000 for equipment 
and materials taken from the farm, and $8,280 for the down 
9 payment) against the amount due and concluded that they owed 
the sum of $57,100. While the calculation is clearly in 
10 error, it is important that Max did not seek to offset any 
gift against the principle amount due. He only sought to 
11 deduct cash payments or payments made in kind. This is 
another indication that Max did not believe that payments had 
12 been forgiven or gifted. Although Max did try to treat the 
interest which would have been due under the contract as a 
13 gift. There is no basis to support treatment of interest as a 
gift. Max and Joyce simply cannot take it upon themselves to 
14 accept a gift that was never offered. Whether others may have 
received gifts is simply not relevant to this inquiry except 
15 that it shows that George and LaRue knew how to transfer 
property by gift when that was their desire. 
16 21. Max and Joyce claim that three payments were 
made. The initial down payment, which the seller 
17 acknowledges; payment for 26 head of cattle in 1979 of 
$24,980, and 10,000 for equipment and material received in 
18 kind. The evidence concerning the $10,000 was not convincing. 
No evidence was produced as to what was taken, when it was 
19 taken, or the value of anything that was taken. The Court 
will, therefore, rule against the defendants as to the $10,000 
20 I payment in kind. The evidence on this sale of cattle is 
conflicting. Exhibit D-7 indicates that cows were sold on 
21 | August 10th, 1979 and that they were George Fisher's cattle. 
Max and Joyce did not record the sale of these cattle in the 
22 | livestock sold book (Exhibit 8) or in their income tax 
returns. On the other hand, the cattle were reported under 
23 | cattle sales by George and LaRue (exhibit P-12). 
Nevertheless, Max and Joyce have each testified that the 26 
24 | head of cattle were their cattle. They produced records, 
Exhibit P-10, which indicates that they had purchased some 54 
25 | cows before the property was transferred in 1974. Max also 
testified that he increased his herd through keeping his 
1 heifer calves. Unfortunately, no record exists as to the 
exact number of cows each owned in May of 1974 when the ranch 
2 was transferred. As between the two parties, the recollection 
of LaRue is not as good as Max's. LaRue simply was not 
3 involved in the daily operation of the dairy and did not have 
a clear recollection concerning these issues. Based upon all 
4 the evidence, the courts finds that the cattle which were sold 
in 1979 were owned by Max and Joyce, therefore, the amount due 
5 under the contract should be reduced by the amount of $24,980. 
22. As previously indicated, based upon the 
6 statement of George that payments would not be expected, a 
home was built upon the property which is free of any 
7 encumbrance to the land. Other buildings were built, 
sprinkling systems were installed, the land was cleared and 
8 graded, ponds were constructed and expanded, and the property 
was improved. The Court finds that the property has been 
9 substantially improved as a direct result of the monies which 
would have otherwise been made toward the contracts being 
10 invested in the property. The defendants relied upon the fact 
that payments would not be required until they were requested 
11 in their decision to invest payment monies into improvements. 
The parties had agreed to defer payments. Therefore, the 
12 defendants were not in default under the terms of the contract 
as modified when notice was sent in March of 1993. Under 
13 these circumstances, even if the contract was breached, it 
would be inequitable for the Sellers to allow and encourage 
14 payments to be invested in the property and then use the 
failure to pay as a basis for breach of contract. 
15 The parties never specifically addressed the issue 
as to whether all payments would become due when George 
16 requested payments to commence. In view of the fact that the 
financial condition of Max and George would not have allowed 
17 them to pay all of the accumulated payments at one time 
(which George was aware of), and in view of the fact that 
18 George said that when he wanted payments he would ask for 
them, the Court finds that the agreement between Max and 
19 George to amend the contract did not contemplate that all 
prior payments become due immediately upon the request of the 
20 Sellers. It was contemplated and agreed that payments would 
be delayed and commenced again when George requested them. 
21 Plaintiff having failed on its complaint is not 
entitled to attorney's fees. Defendant has not produced any 
22 evidence as to attorney's fees or reserved the issue, 
therefore, the defendants request for attorney's fees is also 
23 denied. 
23. Modification of this contract is not 
24 prohibited under the statute of frauds. In this case the 
modification did not concern any issue dealing with title to 
25 the property. The modification came after buyer had entered 
into possession and began to perform under the contract. The 
1 modification was limited to the timing of payments only. It 
did not change the amount due. The contract was partially 
2 performed, and the defendant relied upon the oral 
representations. The improvements were substantial and 
3 valuable. The decision to invest in the property rather than 
make payments was exclusively referable to the oral 
4 modification. The Court believes that the defendant changed 
positions by performing on the oral modification so that it 
5 would now be inequitable to permit the Seller to found their 
claim for breach on the original agreement as unmodified. I 
6 am particularly concerned about the home that was built, which 
is free of encumbrance to the land but which has a mortgage 
7 secured by equipment and cattle which is owned by Max and 
Joyce. Even if there was a breach of contract in this case, 
8 I under the circumstances, it would be entirely inappropriate 
and unequitable to allow the Sellers to forfeit the property. 
9 Forfeiture is just not an appropriate remedy in this case. 
24. Because of the conflicts which are very 
10 apparent in this matter and also because of other conflicts 
which have existed between Max and his mother and also Max and 
11 his brother Brent, the Court believes that there has developed 
deep seated feelings of animosity between the co-trustees. I 
12 think that as is common with family situations where there is 
a disagreement, there is also a feeling by the parties that 
13 they have been betrayed by a loved one. In this case, these 
feelings are so strong that it would be, in my judgment, 
14 impossible for the parties to work together as co-trustees of 
the trust. Perhaps over the long run, these wounds can heal. 
15 But the business of running the trust requires immediate 
cooperation between the trustees. These people cannot even 
16 comfortably talk with one another, let alone work with one 
another in dealing with problems which the trust will face. I 
17 believe that these feelings are so strongly held that they 
would invariably interfere with the duty which each has 
18 towards the trust. In addition, Max is equivocable about his 
interest in continuing as trustee. Under the circumstances of 
19 this case, the Court believes that it would be appropriate to 
remove Max as trustee, and the motion of the plaintiff with 
20 respect to that matter is granted. 
To sum up the Court's conclusions, the Court 
21 concludes that the defendants were not in breach at the time 
the notice of default was sent, that the purchasers owe the 
22 entire sum under the contract plus interest less the down 
payment and the amount received for cattle ($24,980). That 
23 neither party is entitled to attorney's fees and that Max 
I should be replaced as trustee. 
24 
25 
D ated ftio-$Y 
LYNN PAYNE; DISTRICT JUDGE 
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FISHER FAMILY TRUST, OWNER 
MAX & JOYCE FISHER, PURCHASER 
May 1, 1993 
Principal: 192,809.00 % Rate: 5.000 
ANNUAL Payment: 10,000 
FINAL est. Payment: 11,545 
Interest 
1994 . . . 9,640.45 
1995 . 
1996 
1997 
1998 . 
1999 . 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 . 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
2025 
2026 
2027 
2028 
2029 
2030 
2031 
2032 
2033 
2034 
2035 
9, 
9, 
9, 
9, 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
622.47 
603.60 
583.78 
562.96 
541.11 
518.17 
494.08 
468.78 
442.22 
414.33 
385.05 
,354.30 
r322.02 
r288.12 
r252.52 
,215.15 
,175.91 
,134.70 
091.44 
,046.01 
,998.31 
,948.22 
,895.64 
,840.42 
r782 .44 
,721.56 
r657.64 
,590.52 
,520.05 
r446.05 
r368.35 
,286.77 
r201.11 
,111.16 
,016.72 
,917.56 
,813.43 
r704.11 
,589.31 
,468.78 
,342.22 
.00 
.19 
Principal 
359.55 
377.53 
396.40 
416.22 
437.04 
458.89 
481.83 
505.92 
531.22 
557.78 
585.67 
614.95 
645.70 
677.98 
711.88 
747.48 
784.85 
824.09 
865.30 
908.56 
953.99 
1,001.69 
1,051.78 
1,104.36 
1,159.58 
1,217.56 
1,278.44 
1,342.36 
1,409.48 
1,479.95 
1,553.95 
1,631.65 
1,713.23 
1,798.89 
1,888.84 
1,983 .28 
2,082.44 
2,186.57 
2,295.89 
2,410.69 
2,531.22 
2,657.78 
Years: 68 
I 
192, 
192, 
191, 
191, 
190, 
190, 
189, 
189, 
188, 
188, 
187, 
187, 
186 
185 
185 
184 
183 
182 
181 
180 
179 
178 
177 
176 
175 
174 
173 
171 
170 
168 
167 
165 
164 
162 
160 
158 
156 
154 
151 
149 
146 
144 
Balance 
449.45 
071.92 
675.52 
259.30 
822.26 
363 .37 
881.54 
375.62 
844.40 
286.62 
700.95 
086.00 
440.30 
762.32 
050.44 
302.96 
518.11 
694.02 
828.72 
920.16 
966.17 
964.48 
912.70 
808.34 
648.76 
431.20 
152.76 
810.40 
400.92 
920.97 
367.02 
735.37 
022.14 
223 .25 
,334.41 
,351.13 
,268.69 
,082.12 
,786.23 
,375.54 
, 844.32 
,186.54 
ADDENDUM - p. 12 
FISHER FAMILY TRUST, OWNER 
MAX & JOYCE FISHER, PURCHASER 
May 1, 1993 
Grand Totals 
Interest 
7 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6, 
6, 
6, 
5, 
5, 
5, 
5, 
4, 
4, 
4, 
4, 
3, 
3, 
3, 
2, 
2, 
2, 
1, 
1, 
488, 
209 
069 
923 
769 
607 
438 
260 
073 
876 
670 
454 
227 
988 
737 
474 
198 
908 
603 
283 
948 
595 
225 
836 
428 
999 
549 
736 
.33 
.79 
.28 
.45 
92 
.32 
.23 
.24 
.91 
75 
29 
00 
35 
77 
66 
39 
.31 
73 
91 
11 
51 
29 
55 
38 
80 
79 
60 
Principal 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
9 
10, 
192, 
,790 
,930 
, 076 
r230 
,392 
,561 
,739 
,926 
,123 
r329 
r545 
, 773 
r011 
r262 
r525 
801 
, 091 
r396 
716 
r051 
404 
774 
163 
571 
000 
995 
809 
.67 
.21 
.72 
.55 
.08 
.68 
.77 
.76 
.09 
.25 
.71 
.00 
.65 
.23 
.34 
.61 
.69 
.27 
.09 
.89 
.49 
.71 
45 
62 
20 
81 
00 
I 
141 
138 
135 
132 
128 
125 
121 
117 
113 
109 
104, 
99 
94, 
89, 
83, 
78, 
72 
65, 
58, 
51, 
44, 
36, 
28, 
19, 
10, 
Balance 
395 
465 
388 
158 
766 
204 
464 
538 
415 
085 
540 
161 
755 
493 
967 
166 
074 
678 
962 
910 
505 
731 
567 
996 
995 
0 
.87 
.66 
.94 
.39 
.31 
.63 
.86 
.10 
.01 
.76 
.05 
.05 
.40 
.17 
.83 
22 
.53 
26 
17 
28 
79 
08 
63 
01 
81 
00 
ADDENDUM - p. 13 
GEORGE FISHER, JR. and LARUE FISHER, Sellers May 1, 1974 
MAX and JOYCE FISHER, Buyers 
Principal 115,720.00 % Rate: 5.000 
ANNUAL Payment: 10,000.00 
FINAL est. Payment: 7,170.13 
Interest 
1975 . . . 5,786.00 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Grand Tc 31c 3tl5 
5,575.30 
5,354.06 
5,121.77 
4,877.86 
4,621.75 
4,352.84 
4,070.48 
3,774.00 
3,462.70 
3,135.84 
2,792.63 
2,432.26 
2,053.87 
1,656.57 
1,239.40 
801.37 
341.44 
tl,450.14 
Principal 
4,214.00 
4,424.70 
4,645.94 
4,878.23 
5,122.14 
5,378.25 
5,647.16 
5,929.52 
6,226.00 
6,537.30 
6,864.16 
7,207.37 
7,567.74 
7,946.13 
8,343 .43 
8,760.60 
9,198.63 
6,828.70 
115,720.00 
Years: 18 
Balance 
111,506.00 
107,081.30 
102,435.36 
97,557.13 
92,434.99 
87,056.74 
81,409.58 
75,480.06 
69,254.06 
62,716.76 
55,852.60 
48,645.23 
41,077.49 
33,131.36 
24,787.93 
16,027.33 
6,828.70 
0.00 
ADDENDUM - p. 14 
U.S. Consumer Price Index -- CPI-U 
All Urban Consumers 
1913-1993 Annual Averages 
(1982-1984 = 100) 
1913 10.0 
1914 10.1 
1915 10.2 
1916 11.0 
1917 12.9 
1918 15.1 
1919 17.4 
1920 20.1 
1921 18.0 
1922 16.9 
1923 17.2 
1924 17.2 
1925 17.6 
1926 17.8 
1927 17.5 
1928 17.2 
1929 17.2 
1930 16.8 
1931 15.3 
1932 13.7 
1933 13.0 
1934 13.5 
1935 13.7 
1936 13.9 
1937 14.4 
1938 14.1 
1939 13.9 
1940 14.0 
1941 14.7 
1942 16.3 
1943 17.3 
1944 17.6 
1945 18.0 
1946 19.5 
1947 22.3 
1948 24.1 
1949 23.8 
1950 24.1 
1951 26.0 
1952 26.5 
1953 26.7 
1954 26.9 
1955 26.8 
1956 27.2 
1957 28.1 
1958 28.9 
1959 29.1 
1960 29.6 
1961 29.9 
1962 30.2 
1963 30.6 
1964 31.0 
1965 31.5 
1966 32.4 
1967 33.4 
1968 34.8 
1969 36.7 
1970 38.8 
1971 40.5 
1972 41.8 
1973 44A 
1974 
1975 53.8 
1976 56.9 
1977 60.6 
1978 65.2 
1979 72.6 
1980 82.4 
1981 90.9 
1982 96.5 
1983 99.6 
1984 103.9 
1985 107.6 
1986 109.6 
1987 113.6 
1988 118.3 
1989 124.0 
1990 130.7 
1991 136.2 
1992 140.3 
1993 (JPTp 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
